Career Progression and Formal versus on the Job Training by Adda & Dustmann
Career Progression and Formal versus on the Job
Training
J. Adda∗ , C. Dustmann† ,C .M e g h i r ‡ , J.-M. Robin§
February 14, 2003
VERY PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE
Abstract
This paper evaluates the return to formal education over the life-cycle
and compare it to informal, on the job training. More speciﬁcally, we assess
the apprenticeship system in Germany by comparing the long run value of
education choices and subsequent labor market outcomes for apprentices
and non-apprentices. We develop a structural model of career progression
and educational choice, allowing for unobserved ability, endogenous job to
job transition, speciﬁc ﬁrm-worker matches, speciﬁc returns to tenure and
to general experience. We estimate this model on a large panel data set
which describes the career progression of young Germans. We ﬁnd that
formal education is more important than informal training, even when
taking into account for the possible selection into education. We use the
estimated model to evaluate the long-run impact of labor market policies
on educational choices and career progression. We ﬁnd that policies such as
the Earned Income Tax Credit which subsidize low wage have a detrimental
eﬀect on the probability of further education and on job mobility.
1 Introduction
This paper evaluates the return to formal education over the life-cycle and com-
pare it to informal, on the job training. More speciﬁcally, we assess the appren-
ticeship system in Germany by comparing the long run value of education choices
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1and subsequent labor market outcomes for apprentices and non-apprentices. We
develop a structural model of career progression and educational choice, allow-
ing for unobserved ability, endogenous job to job transition, speciﬁc ﬁrm-worker
matches, speciﬁc returns to tenure and to general experience. We estimate this
model on a large panel data set which describes the career progression of young
Germans. We ﬁnd that formal education is more important than informal train-
ing, even when taking into account for the possible selection into education. We
use the estimated model to evaluate the long-run impact of labor market policies
on educational choices and career progression. We ﬁnd that policies such as the
Earned Income Tax Credit which subsidize low wage have a detrimental eﬀect on
the probability of further education and on job mobility.
2 The Data Set
2.1 The Data Set
We use a 1% extract of the German social security records. The data set follows
a large number of young individual from 1975 to 1995. For each individual in
the sample, we get the exact employment date (starting date, end date) for each
job. The data set also reports the daily wage each year if the individual stays
an entire year, or for the part of the year the individual works for the ﬁrm. We
aggregate the data to obtain information on a quarterly basis.
The data set also reports the periods of apprenticeship training. For the pur-
pose of this study, we select our sample to consist only of West-German males,
with only post-secondary education and who start either work or an apprentice-
ship after school. In total, we follow 27525 individuals through time, quarter
after quarter up to 1995.
2.2 Descriptive Data
Figure 1 displays the log wage proﬁle as a function of years of labor market ex-
perience for apprentices and non apprentices. Individuals with an apprenticeship
training have on average higher wages, but a ﬂatter wage proﬁle. In contrast,
non apprentices start at a low wage and experience a rapid wage growth, but the
wage gap never closes.
Apprentices are also more likely to work as shown in Figure 2. This is espe-
cially true in the ﬁrst years in the labor market. Figure 3 shows the proportion
of workers exiting from the labor market as a function of labor market experience
and education. Similarly, apprentices are more likely to re-enter the labor mar-
ket, conditional on not working. After ten years of experience, both education
groups appear to have the same re-entry behavior.
2Figure 1: Log Wage and Labor Market Experience
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Figure 2: Proportion not Working and Labor Market Experience
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3Figure 3: Probability of Exit from Labor Market
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Figure 4: Probability of Entry in Labor Market
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4The two groups also diﬀers by the number of jobs hold over time. Non ap-
prentices are much more mobile, going from ﬁrm to ﬁrm, especially in the ﬁrst
years (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Cumulative Number of Jobs and Labor Market Experience
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Next, we try to decompose the wage growth into diﬀerent components. Fig-
ure 6 displays the changes in the log wage for individuals who change jobs. In the
ﬁrst years in the labor market, the wage growth can be substantial, at about 30%
for non apprentices and 10% to 20% for apprentices. The gain in wages reduces
over time, decreasing towards zero.
Figure 7 displays the wage growth conditional on staying with the same ﬁrm
for two consecutive periods. The wage growth is of an order of 1 to 2% and is
higher in the ﬁrst 4 years for non apprentices.
Hence, most of the wage growth is due to job to job transition and very little
to gains in experience or tenure. It appears that the rapid wage growth of non
apprentices is mostly due to better matches and job search in the early years.
However, the results in both Figures are potentially biased, because mobility may
be endogenous. Our model will be able to disentangle the selection eﬀect from
the determinant of wage growth.
5Figure 6: Changes in Log Wage (Between) and Labor Market Experience
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Figure 7: Changes in Log Wage (Within) and Labor Market Experience
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6Figure 8: OLS, Estimation of Return to Experience
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Figure 9: OLS, Estimation of Return to Tenure
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73 The Model
We model jointly the education decision and the labor market progression for
a given individual. The decision to go into apprenticeship or not depends on
the future returns to apprenticeship, so we will ﬁrst detail the model of career
progression conditional on education choices.
3.1 Labor Market
Consider an agent with education level Ed, equal to either one (apprenticeship
training) or zero (only post secondary education). While working, the agent
accumulates general labor market experience, which is a function of the number
of years in the labor market, X, and ﬁrm speciﬁc experience, which is a function
of the number of years spent in a particular ﬁrm (tenure or seniority), T.E a c h
employed individual experience a ﬁrm-worker match speciﬁc eﬀect, denoted κ(T).
We allow this eﬀect to be time varying and correlated through time. We model
it as a random walk:
κ(T)=κ(T − 1) + uV (u)=σ
2
u V (κ(0)) = σ
2
0
The match speciﬁc eﬀect is indexed by the tenure as its variance is non stationary.
The wage is a function of labor market experience, tenure, education, ability,
denoted ε, the match speciﬁc eﬀect and of an aggregate business cycle eﬀect,
denoted G:
w = w(X,T,Ed,G,ε,κ(T))
Two alternative job oﬀers diﬀers because of the match speciﬁc eﬀect.
In any given period, the agent can be either employed or not employed. If
unemployed, the agent gets unemployment beneﬁts and receive with a probability
λU a job oﬀer. The agent rejects the oﬀer if the proposed wage is below his
reservation wage, waiting for a better oﬀer (match speciﬁc eﬀect) to come.
If employed, the agent derives a utility from the wage and keeps his job next
period with a probability 1 − δ. The agent may also receive a job oﬀer, while on
the job, with a probability λW. The agent would move to a new ﬁrm if the wage
is higher than the reservation wage.
We denote the value of working, i.e. the intertemporal ﬂow of discounted
utility as Wt. Similarly, we denote Ut the value of unemployment. The value of
working is deﬁned recursively as:
Wt(X,T,G,Ed,ε,κ(T)) = wt(X,T,Ed,G,ε,κ(T)) (1)
+βδEG Ut+1(X +1 ,T+1 ,G
 ,Ed,ε,κ(T))
+β(1 − λW)(1 − δ)EG ,κ Wt+1(X +1 ,T+1 ,G
 ,Ed,ε,κ(T +1 ) )
+β(1 − δ)λWEG ,κ ,˜ κ  max[Wt+1(X +1 ,T+1 ,G
 ,Ed,ε,κ
 (T +1 ) ) ,
Wt+1(X +1 ,0,G
 ,Ed,ε,˜ κ
 (0))]
8The value is the sum of the wage plus the discounted value of the future. With
a probability δ the agent goes into unemployment, at the end of the period. He
then starts next period with one additional unit of experience and of tenure,
faces a new state of aggregate business cycle, and stay with the same level of
the match speciﬁc eﬀect. 1 The agent has rational expectation over the future
aggregate state of the economy G . With a probability λW, the agent receives
an alternative oﬀer, characterized by the match speciﬁc eﬀect ˜ κ (0). The agent
compares the value of staying in the current ﬁrm with the value of moving. If
the agent moves to the new ﬁrm, he loses all tenure and starts at zero.
The value of unemployment is deﬁned recursively as:
Ut(X,T,G,Ed,ε,κ(T)) = αwt(X,T,Ed,G,ε,κ(T)) (2)
+β(1 − λU)EG Ut+1(X,T,G
 ,Ed,ε,κ(T))
+βλUEG ,˜ κ  max[Ut+1(X,T,G
 ,Ed,ε,κ(T)),
Wt+1(X,0,G
 ,Ed,ε,˜ κ
 (0))]
α is the fraction of the last wage the individual receives in unemployment beneﬁts.
With a probability 1 − λU, the individual does not receive a job oﬀer and stays
in unemployment next period and faces a potential diﬀerent business cycle G .I f
a job oﬀer is received, consisting in a match speciﬁc eﬀect ˜ κ (0), the agent opts
for the choice which maximizes his intertemporal utility.
The job arrival and destruction rates are heterogenous across workers and
depends on the time spent in the labor market, the tenure, the ability of the
agent, the business cycle and the match speciﬁc eﬀect:



δ = δ(X,T,G,Ed,ε,κ)
λW = λW(X,T,G,Ed,ε)
λU = λU(X,G,Ed,ε)
We assume that the business cycle can be described by a ﬁrst order process:
Gt = µG + ρGGt−1 + uGt Gt = ln(Detrended GDPt)
3.2 Structure of education choices
Denote the value of apprenticeship as: A(G,R,ε,T A), where G is an indicator of
the current business cycle, R is the region of living, ε is a measure of ability and T A
is the length of apprenticeship. We model the value of going into apprenticeship
as:
A(G,R,ε,T
A)=cA(G,R,ε)+η
A + δβ
TA
EG U(T
A,T
A,G
 ,1,ε,κ(T
A))
+(1 − δ)β
TA
EG Wt(T
A,T
A,G
 ,1,ε,κ(T
A))
1The value of unemployment keeps track of this match speciﬁc eﬀect as well as the tenure
in order to calculate the unemployment beneﬁts, deﬁned as a fraction of the last wage.
9An apprentice incurs a cost which depends on the region of living, the business
cycle and unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, the agent receive a taste shock
ηA, assumed to follow an extreme value distribution. After T A periods, the agent
is a trained apprentice with T A periods of experience and tenure. The agent can
either keep the job within the same ﬁrm or be ﬁred.
The value of not going into apprenticeship is expressed as:
NA(G,ε)=η
NA+ U(0,0,G,0,ε,κ(0))
i.e., the agent looks for a job having zero tenure and experience. Here again, the
agent experiences an extreme value distributed taste shock. Taking advantage
of the property of the extreme value distribution, the probability of going into
apprenticeship is expressed as:
P(Apprentice|G,R,ε)=
exp(A(G,R,ε,T
A))
exp(NA(G,ε)) + exp(A(G,R,ε,T
A))
Hence, the education choices depend on the return to apprenticeship, which diﬀers
by ability, across time through the business cycle eﬀect and across regions. We
rely on regional diﬀerences which shifts the cost of training to better identify the
parameters of the model.
The model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood. The likelihood is detailed in
the appendix. We follow each individual from the schooling decision and during
his career for up to 20 years. For a given individual, we compute the likelihood of
the education choice, the likelihood of any transition in or out the labor market,
the likelihood of job to job transitions and the likelihood of observing a partic-
ular wage. We allow for ﬁxed unobserved heterogeneity (ability) by assuming a
discrete mass point distribution with two points of support.
4 Results
In total we have over 100 parameters. The results are best seen through a series
of graphs.
Figure 10 displays the eﬀect of labor market experience on log wages, con-
ditional on ability and on staying forever in the same ﬁrm (with a zero match
speciﬁc eﬀect), for apprentices and non apprentices. The increase in log wage is
due to the combined eﬀect of the return to experience and tenure. Non appren-
tices starts at a lower wage but catch up rapidly in the ﬁrst two years. However,
even after 20 years, there is still a gap between education groups suggesting that
the value of training is positive. The wage growth for apprentices is very low,
approximately 0.3% per year.
Figure 11 displays the eﬀect of unobserved ability on wages. High ability
types earn up to 30% more. Next we break down the increase in the log wage
10Figure 10: Eﬀect of Labor Market Experience on Wages, Conditional on Ability
between the return to experience and to tenure. For apprentices, the return to
tenure is about 0.75% per year, with a non linear pattern. The individual learns
more in the ﬁrst years. The return to experience is extremely low. In contrast,
the return to tenure for non apprentices is higher at about 1.7% per year and the
return to experience is at about 1% per year. Here again, most of the eﬀect is in
the early years.
Figure 13 displays the probability of apprenticeship training by region and
by ability. High ability individuals are more likely to go through apprentice-
ship. This explains partly the diﬀerences in wages, but not entirely as shown in
Figure 10. The probabilities also vary by region, reﬂecting diﬀerent costs.
5 Policy Evaluations
In this section, we evaluate the eﬀect of labor market policies on career progression
and education choices. In particular, we evaluate the eﬀect of in-work beneﬁts
on human capital accumulation and acquisition of skills. These policies oﬀer
subsidies to employed individuals with a low wage. Examples of such policies
are the Earn Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US and the Working Family Tax
Credit (WFTC) in the UK. These policies are in place to encourage labor market
participation.
We simulate a reform similar to the EITC, where low wage individuals get a
subsidy. This subsidy starts at 0 for a zero wage, increases with the wage up to
11Figure 11: Eﬀect of Ability on Wages, Non Apprentices
a ﬁrst limit, stays constant over a range of income and ﬁnally declines to zero.
Hence, two categories of individuals do not receive a subsidy: individuals not
working and individuals with a high enough wage.
In general, these in-work beneﬁt policies have an eﬀect on labor market par-
ticipation. However, these policies could also have detrimental long-term eﬀects
on education choices and skill acquisition. As lower wages are subsidized, indi-
viduals are less likely to obtain higher education levels as the wage gap between
education groups might decrease. Second, due to the non linearity of the beneﬁts,
the policy might discourage job-to-job mobility. This would reduce the mobility
of workers across jobs and slow down or prevent the best matches between ﬁrms
and workers to form, decreasing over-all productivity.
Figures 14 to 16 show the results of the policies simulated from the estimated
model. The policy has a positive impact on labor participation but a negative
one on overall productivity.
6 Conclusion [to be written]
12Figure 12: Return to Experience and Return to Tenure
13Figure 13: Probability of Apprenticeship Training by Region and Ability
Appendix
A Likelihood
The likelihood is constructed by multiplying the sequence of transition probabil-
ities conditional on the person-speciﬁc eﬀect and integrating it out.
A.1 Likelihood of Transitions
The data consists in a succession of transitions from one state to the other and
in a succession of wages. The possible states are S = U, unemployed, S = E,
employed or S = ˜ E, employed in a diﬀerent ﬁrm from previous period. In the
ﬁrst period, the agent is by assumption unemployed, so that S1 = U and w1 = .
L(ε)=P(ST,S T−1,...,S 1,w T,...,w 1|ε)
with the convention that wt = . if unemployed. Given the ﬁrst order correlation
in the match speciﬁc shock, the likelihood can be written as:
L(ε)=P(ST,w T|ST−1,w T−1,ε)...P(S2,w 2|S1,w 1,ε)P(S1,w 1|ε)
with P(S1,w 1) = 1. We next characterize the conditional probability P(St,w t|St−1,w t−1,ε).
There are ﬁve possible sorts of transitions:
14Figure 14: Eﬀect of In-Work Beneﬁts on Labor Market Participation
15Figure 15: Eﬀect of In-Work Beneﬁts on Firm-Worker Match
16Figure 16: Eﬀect of In-Work Beneﬁts on Wages
171. Transition E to U: St = U, St−1 = E:
PEU = P(St,w t|St−1,w t−1,ε)
= δ(X,T,G,Ed,ε)
which is the probability of being ﬁred.
2. Transition U to U: St = U, St−1 = U:
PUU = P(St,w t|St−1,w t−1,ε)
=( 1 − λU)+λUP˜ κ [U(X,T,G,Ed,ε,κ(T)) >W t(X,0,G,Ed,ε,˜ κ(0))]
3. Transition U to E: St = E, St−1 = U:
PUE = P(St,w t|St−1,w t−1,ε)
= λUI[U(X,T,G,Ed,κt(T)) <W(X,0,G,Ed,κ t(0))]
P(wt|U(X,T,G,Ed,κt(T)) <W(X,0,G,Ed,κ t(0)))
= λUI[U(X,T,G,Ed,ε,w t  − γ(ε)Zt ) <W(X,0,G,Ed,ε,w t − γ(ε)Zt)]
P(wt|U(X,T,G,Ed,ε,wt  − γ(ε)Zt ) <W(X,0,G,Ed,ε,w t − γ(ε)Zt))
where I is an index function and t  is the period the individual was last seen
working. Deﬁne κ∗(X,T,G,Ed,ε,κ t (T)) as the match speciﬁc threshold
for which the agent is indiﬀerent between working and staying in unem-
ployment.
P(wt | U(X,T,G,Ed,ε,κ(T)) <W(X,0,G,Ed,ε,w t − γ(ε)Zt))
= P(wt|˜ κt(0) >κ
∗(X,T,G,Ed,ε,κ(T)))
=
1
σK(0)(1 − Φ(κ
∗(X,T,G,Ed,ε,κ(T))
σκ(0) )
φ(
wt − γ(ε)Zt
σK(0)
)
where φ is the density of the normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1.
4. Transition E to same E: St = E, St−1 = E:
We denote ˜ wt the outside oﬀer.
PEE = P(St,w t|St−1,w t−1,ε)
=( 1 − δ)(1 − λW)P(wt|wt−1,ε)
+(1 − δ)λWP(wt|wt−1,W(Xt,0,G t,Ed,ε,˜ κt(0)) <W(Xt,T t,G t,Ed,ε,κ t(Tt)))
18The ﬁrst part is when no outside oﬀer is received. The second part is when
an outside oﬀer is received but declined. Given the notation, the wages can
be written as:
˜ wt = γ(ε) ˜ Zt +˜ κt
wt = γ(ε)Zt + κt = γ(ε)Zt + κt−1 + uκ,t = γ(ε)Zt +( wt−1 − γ(ε)Zt−1)+uκ,t
so that
P(wt|wt−1,ε)=
1
σu
φ(
wt − γ(ε)Zt − (wt−1 − γ(ε)Zt−1)
σu
)
and
P(wt | wt−1,W(Xt,T t,G t,Ed,ε,κ t(T)) >W(Xt,0,G t,Ed,ε,˜ κt(0)))
= P(wt|wt−1,κ t(T) >κ
∗
EE(˜ κt(0),Z t,ε))
= P(wt|wt−1,u κ,t >κ
∗
EE(˜ κt(0),Z t,ε) − (wt−1 − γ(ε)Zt−1))
= P(wt|wt−1,u κ,t >x
∗(˜ κt(0),Z t,ε,w t−1,Z t−1))
=
e
−
(wt − γ(ε)Zt − (wt−1 − γ(ε)Zt−1))
2
2σ
2
u
√
2πσu
  κ∗−1(κt)
−∞
φσκ(0)(˜ κ)
1 − Φ(
x
∗(˜ κt,Z t,ε,w t−1,Z t−1)
σu
)
d˜ κ
where κ∗
EE(˜ κ(0),Z t,ε) is a threshold, beyond which the agent prefers to
stay in the same job. For simplicity, we denote x∗(˜ κt(0),Z t,ε,w t−1,Z t−1)=
κ∗
EE(˜ κ(0),Z t,ε) − (wt−1 − γ(ε)Zt−1). If we discretize the process κt and
approximate it by a Markov process, the expression simpliﬁes to:
P(wt | wt−1,W(Xt,T t,G t,Ed,ε,κ t(T)) >W(Xt,0,G t,Ed,ε,˜ κt(0)))
=
e
−
(wt − γ(ε)Zt − (wt−1 − γ(ε)Zt−1))
2
2σ
2
u
√
2πσu
 
i
πi
1 − Φ(
x
∗(˜ κi(0),Z t,ε,w t−1,Z t−1)
σu
)
where πi is a weight associated with ˜ κi(0).
5. Transition E to new E: St = ˜ E, St−1 = E:
PE ˜ E = P(St,w t|St−1,w t−1,ε)
=( 1 − δ)λWP(wt|wt−1,W(Xt,0,G t,Ed,ε,˜ κt(0)) >W(Xt,T t,G t,Ed,ε,κ t(T)))
Similarly,
19PE ˜ E =( 1 − δ)λWP(wt|wt−1, ˜ κt(0) >κ
∗
E ˜ E(κt(T),Z t,ε))
=( 1 − δ)λWP(wt|˜ κt(0) >κ
∗
E ˜ E(uκ,t +( wt−1 − γ(ε)Zt−1),Z t,ε))
=( 1 − δ)λW
e
−
(wt − γ(ε)Zt)
2
2σ
2
κ(0)
√
2πσκ(0)
  κ∗−1(˜ κ0,Zt,ε)
−∞
φσu(uκ)
1 − Φ
 
κ
∗
E ˜ E(uκ +( wt−1 − γ(ε)Zt−1),Z t,ε)
σκ(0)
 duκ
20